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How to Regain Public Trust in Audit Firms? The Case of the Financial Reporting 
Council  
Abstract 
This study aims to provide a better understanding of the role of the Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC) in restoring public trust in audit profession in the UK. It analyses the views of 
partners in the Big 4 audit firms on this role. This study identifies three main strategies to 
promote trust and enhance the choice of auditors in the UK audit market. These strategies are 
improving audit quality, increasing the transparency of the big audit firms and reducing the 
barriers to competition in the audit market. The findings suggest that partners of the Big 4 
believe that the FRC's projects effectively participate in improving audit quality as well as 
providing wider information about the audit firms to the public. However, different actions 
need to be taken to enhance the choice in the market. 
Key words: UK audit market – Audit regulations – Big 4 firms 
1. Introduction 
The independent oversight of the audit profession has become a global phenomenon in the 
last decade. Independent regulators have undergone 50 years of self-regulation (Defond, 
2005).  
The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) is one of those new regulators, which has become, in 
2004, the unified independent regulator for corporate reporting and governance. It aims to 
promote confidence in corporate reporting and governance, exercising its functions through 
six operating bodies
1
. The Auditing Practices Board and the Professional Oversight Board are 
the most relevant bodies regulating the audit profession (FRC, 2009). Despite the FRC’s 
efforts to restore public confidence, trust in auditors arguably needs to be regained (ICAEW, 
2012). Following the UK financial crisis in 2008, auditors lacked independence and 
objectivity; regulatory actions are needed to mitigate the risk of further collapses (Sikka, 
2009).      
Since 2005, the UK government has been concerned about increased concentration of the Big 
4 firms in auditing the large listed companies in the capital market (FTSE 100, and FTSE 
350). The Big 4 audit 99% of the largest UK listed companies and their audit fees represent 
99% of the audit fees in the FTSE 350 companies (Oxera, 2006). The Market Participants 
Group (MPG) was established and specific projects and regulations have since been 
implemented to enhance the choice in the UK audit market, but there is little evidence of 
progress in a highly concentrated UK market (FRC, 2010: b). 
This study examines the success of the new UK audit regulators work to regain the public 
trust, while exploring auditors’ perceptions of the FRC’s effectiveness. Understanding the 
FRC’s role in promoting public confidence and auditors’ good perceptions of the FRC can 
bridge the expectation gap between auditors and regulators. They should enhance the 
effectiveness of applying audit regulations in the audit market to create more convictions and 
less resistance in implementing them. It is worth noting that investors’ perception should also 
be considered, but this topic is beyond the scope of this study.    
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 The six operating bodies are: Accounting Standards Board (ASB), Auditing Practices Board (APB), Board for 
Actuarial Standards (BAS), Professional Oversight Board (POB), Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP), 
and Accounting and Actuarial Discipline Board (AADB). 
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An analysis of the FRC’s efforts may help auditors to identify what they are expected to do to 
improve the reliability of information provided in the capital market. Audit committees can 
get a better understanding of the criteria they need to improve the process of auditors' choice. 
Auditors will also better understand how and why current audit regulations have been issued. 
This may improve their satisfaction with regulations and standards, and their efficient 
implementation. Furthermore, we believe that audit regulators need to get feedback additional 
to the formal feedback they receive to improve their performance and current regulations. 
Formal feedback is beneficial, but auditors may not say everything in formal documents
2
. The 
confidentiality assurance given to the interviewees of this study maximises the value of this 
feedback. Here participants understand that no names or firms will be disclosed and nothing 
can stop them from freely criticising the regulators' performance.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews previous studies and 
explains the extent to which this study contributes to the current debate. Section 3 details the 
research methodology. Sections 4, 5, and 6 discuss, develop and analyse the core categories 
of the emerged theory. The final section sets out our conclusions. 
2. Prior research  
The independent oversight of the audit profession has been examined from different 
perspectives. The functions of the audit oversight system established for the first time in the 
U.S market have been examined in the literature (DeFond and Francis, 2005; Bather and 
Burnaby, 2006; Abernathy, et al., 2013). Hazgui et al. (2011) examine the influence of the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and its working approach on 
European audit regulators (i.e. France). They argue that the regulatory regime of PCAOB 
constitutes a “strong driver” to shape the structure of European inspectors’ authorities. 
However, these studies neither analyse the independent regulators efforts nor discuss the 
auditors’ views on such efforts. This study analyses audit regulatory projects in a major 
European country (i.e. the UK).        
The effects of the new system on the audit market have dominated the literature in the last 
decade (Hope and Langli, 2010; Hoitash et al., 2008). Auditors have become more 
conservative and follow more rigid policies to accept or continue with clients (Patterson and 
Smith, 2007). The number of qualified audit reports has increased (Geiger and Raghunandan, 
2005) and the amount of fraud has decreased (Patterson and Smith, 2007). Public interests 
have been intensively considered by regulators and audit firms when compared with the self-
regulated stage (Suddaby et al., 2007). However, to what extent are such effects desired? 
What do regulators really aim to achieve as a result of their projects? And do their projects 
achieve their objectives? Answering such questions can be a basis for a meaningful 
evaluation of the regulators’ performance.      
Some studies have compared audit regulators post-Enron and their pre-Enron peers in 
different countries (Casterella et al., 2009; Pierce and Sweeney, 2004). Independent 
regulators are arguably more effective in monitoring audit markets as a result of the power of 
their sanctions. New relationships have been identified between the new regulatory bodies 
and other institutions (such as professional bodies and Big 4 firms) (Humphrey et al., 2009; 
Carson, 2009; Cooper and Robson, 2006). The mutual influence among different players has 
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 “We cannot criticize our regulators” - one of the Big 4 firms’ partners in his speech in the Auditing and 




 of May 2012, organised by the 
special group of Auditing, British Accounting and Finance Association (BAFA).    
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been examined (Shapiro and Matson, 2008) and independent audit oversight has been 
criticised as many of its regulators are retired partners of the Big 4 firms. This is a mean of 
dominating the regulatory bodies by the Big 4 firms and a regression to the self-regulated era.  
Few studies have analysed the working approaches of Independent Audit Oversight Boards in 
different environments. For example, the PCAOB has given more attention to protect the 
auditor’s independence and mitigates risks of management pressures (Bather and Burnaby, 
2006). The US audit regulators have prohibited auditors from providing some particular 
assurance services to their audit client. Consequently, audit regulators in other regions (i.e. 
Norway) have taken a similar action and apply more restrictions on the provision of non-audit 
services (Eilifsen and Knivsflå, 2013). This is not the case in every region where, in the UK 
for example, audit regulators follow the safeguards approach; meaning that auditors can 
provide many of non-audit services to their audit clients once they assure that the relevant 
safeguard is applicable. But independence is not everything for rebuilding investors’ trust in 
auditors; Gradison and Boster (2010) argue that the PCAOB protect public interests by 
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures. However, Evans et al. (2011) 
suggest that the PCAOB should provide greater transparency in their reports to serve the 
public (i.e. investors and audit committees).  
In Europe, a number of strategies have been followed by oversight authorities to rebuild 
public trust in auditors. For example, improving audit quality (Duff, 2009), strengthening 
auditors’ independence, enhancing corporate governance (Cuebas, 2010; Ojo, 2007), and 
increasing transparency and public disclosures of provided information in the capital market 
(IOSCO, 2010) are the main strategies identified to achieve this aim.  
In the UK, the literature suggests that the FRC’s supervision helps the audit market to be 
more quality oriented (Oxera, 2006); audit quality becomes a core value inside the UK audit 
firms (Hanney, 2006) and overrides other financial motivations (Duff, 2009). However, there 
is no one agreed definition for the audit quality in the literature and even the FRC’s Audit 
Quality Framework (2008) has been criticised (Knechel, 2009).  
In addition, more information about the Big 4 firms and their relations with their global 
networks has been called for (Basel, 2008; FRC, 2007). The global structure of the Big 4 
networks and their national firms have not been widely examined (Basel, 2008). Governance 
of the Big 4 firms is seen as black boxes that need to be more understandable (IOSCO, 2010).  
To sum up, the FRC, as a unified audit regulator in the UK, aims to promote public 
confidence in the capital market including the audit profession (FRC, 2007). Thus, how could 
this confidence be promoted? This study analyses the main projects issued by the FRC. Such 
analysis can provide a better understanding of how the regulators work to enhance the 
reliability of audit reports in a non-US market and whether these regulations have achieved 
their aim. 
3. Research methodology 
Two objectives have been identified in this study: to analyse the FRC’s strategies to promote 
public trust in auditors and to discuss practitioners’ perceptions of the FRC’s efforts. We use 
a documentary analysis to analyse the FRC’s projects and its working approach. However, 
analysing published documents is not enough to explore auditors’ perceptions on the FRC’s 
efforts. Thus, we used interviews to collect relevant data to understand practitioners’ 
perceptions of the FRC’s efforts. Interviews allow access to what is going on ‘behind the 
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scenes’ and interviewees can explain the actuality of their experiences in a complex 
environment.   
The absence of prior research (LoBiondo-Wood and Haber, 1994) and the nature of the 
research questions, which start with what and how (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), support the 
use of qualitative data in this study. Furthermore, this study depends on the perceptions of the 
main participants toward the FRC’s strategies in rebuilding public trust3. Parker and Roffey 
(1997) argue that studies which begin with predefined operational variables exclude the 
possibility of identifying new variables or categories of data, or a more meaningful analysis 
of the relationships between variables.   
Research data was gathered by conducting 17 semi-structured interviews (six interviews with 
the top management of FRC’s members and 11 interviews of executive partners of the Big 4 
firms in the UK). Each interview took from one to two hours. Interviewees were asked open 
questions to explore the current efforts of the FRC to improve the audit profession and their 
perceptions of these efforts. Gathering data from different groups of participants (regulators 
and auditors particularly) enables us not only to discuss different views on the role of 
independent regulators in promoting confidence in auditors, but also to analyse these views 
and provide a better understanding of this role. The interviews were complemented by 
analysing data available on the Web pages of the Big 4 firms and published reports. This 
documentary evidence was collected and analysed to facilitate comparisons with the 
perceptions of the interviewees and validate the findings.        
The data gathered was analysed using coding procedures comprising open, axial and selective 
coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Open coding is an analytic process through which 
concepts are identified with their properties and dimensions. It is done by a line-by-line 
analysis method to provide certain concepts then grouped into categories. The process of 
axial coding is followed by undertaking relationships among the developed categories. At this 
stage, more interviews are conducted to reach a saturation level in which no more ideas can 
be developed. The third coding stage is selective coding as the process of integrating and 
refining the developed theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The emerged theory was validated 
following the Strauss and Corbin approach (Elharidy et al., 2008). 
The findings reflect our critical analysis for the participants’ data. Gathering data from 
different groups of participants (regulators and auditors particularly) enables us not only to 
discuss different views on the role of independent regulators in promoting confidence in 
auditors, but to analyse these views and provide a better understanding of this role. We then 
recommend actions that need to be taken by the UK audit regulators to improve the auditors’ 
choice and regain the public trust in auditors. 
4. Findings: FRC’s strategies to restore public trust in auditors 
“The analyst reduces data from many cases into concepts and sets of relational 
statements that can be used to explain, in a general sense, what is going on” (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998, p.145)  
At the centre of this study are the main strategies followed by the FRC (as one of independent 
audit regulators in a major European country) to promote confidence in the audit market. 
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 Goddard and Assad (2006) argue that the interpretive approach was adopted to achieve a similar purpose 
(understanding the perceptions of the research participants). 
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Three strategies were identified during the analysis process: assuring the quality of the audit 
firms’ performance; increasing the transparency of the big audit firms; and reducing the 
barriers of entering the big audit market. Most of the FRC’s projects focused on firms that 
audit public interest entities rather than small firms that only audit non-listed companies, 
which are still self-regulated by the professional bodies
4
. Our analysis was extended to 
explore the Big 4 firms’ perceptions regarding such strategies, while a number of suggestions 
to improve the FRC’s performance are provided in our conclusion.   
4.1 Improve quality of audit firms’ performance   
One of the main strategies of the independent regulators is to improve the quality of audit 
process. Intensive inspections have been conducted to assure an acceptable level of quality 
within audit firms. For example, the FRC established the Audit Inspection Unit (AIU) to 
review the annual performance of firms that audit public companies. The AIU’s annual 
reports are available to the public to provide clarity about the reliability of audit reports of 
listed companies. The AIU’s inspection aims to identify the areas in which improvements are 
required in order to enhance the audit quality. Although the AIU’s reports state that they are 
not intended to be a balanced scorecard or rating tool for inspected firms, these reports 
provide comparable information about the inspected firms and the quality of their auditing. 
This data can be used to differentiate among the Big 4 firms when companies need to select 
their external auditor.  
Every year the AIU focuses on specific areas in the financial statements of audited clients in 
its inspection. However, the AIU’s inspection only comprises of a review of the quality of 
selected audits of listed and other major public interest entities within the scope of 
independent inspection.  
“It was felt that it would be beneficial to focus only on public interest entity audits” 
(Regulator).    
This helps the AIU to focus uniquely on the major firms better to review the selected firms.  
“It is not relevant to review a one-man audit firm and a firm that employs about 3000 
audit staff by the same team” (Regulator).    
The outputs of the AIU’s inspection help the UK audit regulators to focus on areas of 
regulations that need further improvement. It is a mutual process between audit regulators 
and inspectors; the regulators issue regulations that assist the AIU’s inspectors in doing their 
work (like the Audit Quality Framework), while the AIU’s findings help the regulators to 
periodically revise their regulations and standards.  
Views of the Big 4 firms towards the AIU  
The Big 4 firms are satisfied with the independent inspectors. They argue that the AIU has 
enhanced the quality of the audit process in the last few years.   
“It is a natural reaction of government for the accounting failures is to increase layers 
of regulation and that is effectively what happened” (Audit partner, Accounting firm 
A). 
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 However, the professional bodies are supervised by the FRC through the Public Oversight Board (POB). 
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The independent oversight of the audit profession is a logical reaction by the government to 
protect public interests after the accounting failures that occurred recently.  
“Our audits are better than six years ago (especially in the quality of 
documentation).” (Audit partner, Accounting firm A) 
“The overall conclusion is the quality of audit work is good.” (Audit partner, 
Accounting firm D) 
However, not only the public can benefit from the AIU’s inspection, auditors can also defend 
themselves in case of litigation. Big 4 partners argue that auditors should not be blamed for 
engagements inspected by the AIU.     
“We welcomed the new regulators who will make the profession more credible 
through the independent reviewers.” (Audit partner, Accounting firm C). 
“The governmental audit oversight gives the audit firms a stamp of approval that says 
they are doing a good job, and removes any doubt that we aren’t doing what we 
should do.”(Audit partner, Accounting firm A) 
The analysis indicates that the audit filling system is one of the main areas to have been 
enhanced. All audit procedures have to be documented - if they are not documented, it has 
not been done - to help auditors support their views and give evidence to justify decisions 
taken in the past.  
 “Actually having that documentation enables you to communicate with the regulator 
to support what you did and make sure that you don’t admit something that you might 
have forgotten to mention because it was some time ago” (Audit partner, Accounting 
firm A). 
The AIU’s performance was also criticised. The AIU’s inspectors do not always work 
effectively.  
“I think they were ticking a box in many cases” (Audit partner, Accounting firm D). 
Partners believe that their audit teams spend much time ticking the boxes or filling in forms.   
“We spent much more time in dealing with all the regulations than we did in the 
past” (Audit partner, Accounting firm A). 
“It would be good if they were concentrating all the time on what are the key risks in 
this audit. Sometimes they concentrate outside of that” (Audit partner, Accounting 
firm A). 
Furthermore, there is a lack of materiality in the AIU’s work. The inspection team spent a 
long time dealing with issues that are not key to the audit process.  
“Their inspection process is very thorough and very detailed” (Audit partner, 
Accounting firm A).  
“I think they will tend to pick up on something quite minor and make a bigger deal of 
it” (Audit partner, Accounting firm A). 
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In contrast, the FRC’s regulators emphasised that it is easy for audit partners to claim this 
because they know their clients very well. But the inspection teams only have limited time to 
review glossy financial statements that are well produced. 
“They are very defensive... They may in certain circumstances say: this was the really 
difficult issue and this is how we dealt with it and that demonstrates we did a 
wonderful job.” (Regulator)       
It seems that more dialogue is needed between auditors and regulators. Auditors should 
clearly explain to the inspectors what they have done, while regulators should also consider 
the circumstances of the time of the audit, not the inspection.   
Some audit partners believed that inspectors’ work is very detailed; once the inspector found 
something – regardless of its materiality – they keep it in their mind all the time.  
“What we found is that once they made a point, be it a valid one or not, they find it 
difficult to let it go” (Audit partner, Accounting firm A). 
Two reasonable issues justify this criticism. The first is that the AIU starts looking at the 
audit files after the archiving period has finished because firms have two months from the 
date of signing the audit reports to archive and finalise everything on the file.  
“If you look at their staff appraisal process, we agree that the firm should make some 
changes to the procedure. But we are already half way through next year’s process, 
so the changes will have to happen later” (Regulator).  
The second issue is that there are certain behavioural issues that firms find very difficult to 
rectify and improve over the years.  
“Quality of substantive analytical review would be one that seems very difficult for 
people to do well enough. Some firms have now said it is just too difficult, every time 
the AIU comes along and says we have not done it well enough” (Regulator).    
Some auditors feel that the inspection team feels obliged to unearth a problem as they are 
accountable and they have to find some issues.  
“It is difficult for them to walk away and say I have no issues to report” (Audit 
partner, Accounting firm A).  
Furthermore, the Big 4 believe that greater attention should be given to corporate governance 
as the accounting expectations gap is higher than the auditing gap.  
“We should improve corporate governance first.” (Audit partner, Accounting firm C). 
The audit firms were concerned that audits often depend on personal judgments and 
inspectors should consider the circumstances of the auditor’s judgment, before rather than 
after.  
“Audit is about judgment in a lot of cases; often, we’re going to have different views 
on judgment.” (Audit partner, Accounting firm A) 
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The Big 4 partners stressed that they may change their documentation systems as a result of 
the AIU’s inspection. However, their audit opinions have never been changed as a result of 
the new regulators.  
“There are things that we do and we tell teams to do, just to keep our regulator 
happy.” (Audit partner, Accounting firm A) 
“I don’t think we change our opinion because there is a regulator review” (Audit 
partner, Accounting firm A). 
There was a different view between the audit partner and the inspection team on a specific 
issue, where the audit partners provide all the documents and evidence that support their 
view.  
“I think we would always go with our judgment, what we think is right.” (Audit 
partner, Accounting firm A) 
Some partners raised a question about the rotation of regulators in different positions and how 
this could improve the quality of the audit oversight system.    
“I think it is important that you don’t get stuck for too long without a new 
experience.” (Audit partner, Accounting firm C). 
4.2 Increasing transparency in the big audit firms  
A better understanding of how the big audit firms work can help to promote public 
confidence, enhance choice in the audit market, and encourage mid-sized firms to enter the 
market (Basel, 2008).  
But what type of information do regulators feel will improve public trust in auditors and 
enhance choice in the audit market? Analysing the FRC’s projects identifies three types of 
information that need to be more understandable: information about the big audit firms’ 
governance structure; the key factors that affect the auditors’ competition in UK capital 
market; and the main ways by which the audit firms consider the public interest in their own 
decisions. Each type is discussed as follows.  
4.2.1 The big audit firms’ governance structure   
The Statutory Auditors Instrument (2008) requires all auditors of UK companies with 
securities traded on a UK regulated market to produce annual transparency reports (POB, 
2010:a). The mandated reports should provide detailed information about the legal and 
governance structures of audit firms (POB, 2010: b). The usefulness of the transparency 
reports were confirmed by the interviewed partners of the Big 4 firms.  
“We’ve been doing it for a long time.” (Audit partner, Accounting firm A) 
“It is sort of double standards to say we are keeping everything about us secretive, at 
the same time insisting that clients disclose this, that and the other.” (Audit partner, 
Accounting firm A) 
However, the auditors believe that more work is required to enhance the quality of these 
reports.   
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“It is a good thing that people understand what our processes are, procedures, 
everything” (Audit partner, Accounting firm C). 
“There is more we can do on our transparency report, and we are working on that” 
(Audit partner, Accounting firm A). 
4.2.2 Key drivers of competition in the UK audit market   
In 2009, the POB carried out an exercise to understand how auditors and audit committees 
assess audit quality in a tendering process. It was clear from the exercise that the firm’s size 
and brand are the main drivers of audit quality (FRC, 2010:b). However, the Big 4 partners 
provided additional groups of audit market drivers. 
The quality of personnel and good relationships with the clients are drivers that can attract the 
clients to choose specific auditors.  
“The mid-sized firms need to get the right people to serve global companies which 
are seeking experts for their business.” (Audit partner, Accounting firm D).  
“It’s all about relationships. I’ll have on-going relationships with clients that have 
no intention of putting their audit out just now, but I am there either helping them 
with other services, or building relationships so that if something goes wrong with 
their existing audit relationship, they have already got a known relationship and 
trust which we can work from.” (Audit partner, Accounting firm D). 
Understanding such drivers helps mid-sized firms to change their strategies and better to 
compete in the big audit market. It also further enhances choice decisions in the audit market. 
4.2.3 Assuring that public interest is considered inside firms’ decisions   
Auditors have social responsibilities towards the public who trust them and rely on their 
reports when taking their investments’ decisions (Suddaby et al., 2007). Thus, in January 
2010, the FRC published the audit firm governance code that aims to provide a formal 
benchmark of good governance practice (FRC, 2010:a). 
One of the key features of the code is the mandatory appointment, by the audit firms, of 
independent non-executives who can be a witness to a firm’s commitment to the public 
interest.  
Big 4 partners believe that independent non-executives can add value to the audit firms’ 
governance and help the board of directors with their experiences.  
 “We are not worried about the new INEs; it helps the external credibility of our 
organisation.” (Audit partner, Accounting firm A) 
“I think it is dangerous for an organisation to become too insular.” (Audit partner, 
Accounting firm C) 
Certain audit firms have already had long term non-executives within their structure, with 
different committees in their governance structure playing similar roles.  
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“Beside the board of directors, we already have different committees similar in their 
nature to the new non-executives.” (Audit partner, Accounting firm A) 
We argue that time is needed to evaluate the non-executives’ performance and the extent to 
which they can help the quality of the audit process and protect public interest.        
“We just need to see how it goes and see what it does because we don’t know when 
we will first do a report on it.” (Audit partner, Accounting firm C) 
“The whole area is brand new; it will take time to be developed. Who knows what will 
happen in the future?” (Regulator)  
However, we raise a question about the independence of the non-executives and the extent to 
which they can provide reliable information because at the end they are selected and paid by 
the firms themselves.  
“You would hope their reputation would be more important and that if there was a 
real problem that they would either sort it out or would resign.” (Regulator) 
“This is a new concept and we have to see how it works.” (Regulator)  
4.3 Reducing barriers to entering the big audit market  
Two types of barriers prevent mid-sized firms from entering the big audit market: financial 
barriers and risk barriers (Oxera, 2006). The following sub-sections give some examples to 
explain how the FRC acted to reduce such barriers.  
4.3.1 Reducing risk barriers  
Auditors have unlimited liability to their audit clients and third parties if they fail to provide 
an appropriate audit opinion. This is one of the main reasons why mid-size audit firms are 
discouraged from competing in the big audit market as the potential compensation (in case of 
an audit failure) is beyond their financial means. The UK Companies Act 2006 allows audit 
firms to limit their liabilities to their clients after approval of the clients’ shareholders.    
The FRC (2008:b) provides guidance on auditor liability limitation agreements explaining 
how these agreements can be implemented to provide valuable assistance to company 
directors and shareholders. However, the FRC reported that no major listed companies are 
known to have entered into a limited liability agreement (FRC, 2010: b).  
The Big 4 partners argued that the largest listed companies do not enter these agreements as 
most of them are listed in the US capital market, which does not allow auditors or managers 
to do so. As a result, when the largest companies do not have these agreements, the next 
group of listed companies will not be willing to be the leaders.   
 “I think there were one or two who were willing to be the leaders in changing the 
market practice.” (Audit partner, Accounting firm A)  
It might not be fair that auditors are being held responsible for the errors of other parties; they 
should be responsible for their own errors.  
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 “The point of liability caps is not that we shouldn’t have liability, it’s that we 
shouldn’t have other’s liability as well as ours.” (Audit partner, Accounting firm B). 
“We think it is a very important piece because it stops the meltdown on the auditors 
being blamed.” (Audit partner, Accounting firm C). 
Furthermore, auditors’ limited liability could increase the effectiveness of choice in the UK 
audit market.  
“We believe they will play an important role in bolstering competition and choice in 
the market” (Accounting firm C).  
Limited liabilities will not affect the quality of the audit process because the audit regulatory 
framework would not be changed accordingly. 
“It doesn’t change our regulatory environment that says we have to comply with these 
standards” (Audit partner, Accounting firm A).   
Auditors believe that it is better to mandate these agreements by the law; otherwise managers 
or shareholders will not enter voluntarily into such agreements. In some European countries 
(i.e. Germany) auditors have a limited liability as part of the law (Weber et al., 2008).   
“The majority were much happier to stay in a body and not have something that could 
be an issue with their shareholders or investors. So the majority wouldn’t really 
entertain being voluntarily moved across.” (Audit partner, Accounting firm A)  
“Where limited liability regimes exist in countries, they are mandated by law and so 
where they are not mandated, who is going to take it up?” (Audit partner, Accounting 
firm C). 
One of the main reasons why companies might enter into these agreements is to enable them 
to obtain audit services at an acceptable price (FRC, 2008:b). However, some Big 4 partners 
stressed that fees are determined by the efforts made to complete the audit process and 
market circumstances, regardless of auditors’ liabilities.   
“We never reduce our fees for the limited liability. This is not an insurance policy.” 
(Audit partner, Accounting firm A) 
“Fees and liabilities don’t come together. The fees are the work we do. It is not a risk 
premium.” (Audit partner, Accounting firm C) 
4.3.2 Reducing the financial barriers  
One of the significant barriers to entering the big audit market is the need for substantial 
resources and expertise to attract international companies (Oxera, 2006). The ability of 
existing audit firms to raise their financial resources is restricted by the UK Companies Act 
that requires audit firms to be controlled by qualified auditors. The FRC (2008:a) argues that 
any changes in the current ownership rules needs to be considered as part of a package of 
measures to improve choice. The paper identified three areas of risk that threaten the audit 
market: an increased concentration in the market; financial considerations associated with 
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outside ownership driving down audit quality; and outside ownership leading to shortages of 
highly skilled auditors.  
The Big 4 partners argue that it is not easy to accept the proposed rules as this will affect 
audit independence.  
“The risk that it could be perceived that they exercise undue influence on the auditor 
to give a certain opinion on a set of accounts” (Audit partner, Accounting firm A) 
We believe that if the rules allowed non-participants to invest in audit firms, they would 
invest in the Big 4 firms rather than medium-sized firms, which will not solve the higher 
concentration problem in the market.  
Our analysis identifies hiring the right people who have expertise in a wide range of 
industries as another barrier to the audit market. 
“The main constraint is having the right people. You can try and compete, but you are 
more likely to win work if you’ve got people who have experience in the sector.” 
(Audit partner, Accounting firm C). 
5 Discussion and Conclusion 
This study aimed to analyse the effectiveness of the FRC’s strategies in restoring public trust 
in auditors and to understand auditors’ perceptions of these strategies. Three strategies have 
been identified: improving the audit quality; increasing the transparency of the big audit 
firms; and reducing the barriers to competing in the major audit market.  
For the first strategy, we conclude that the annual inspections of the Audit Inspection Unit’s 
team have increased audit quality. In particular, great attention has been paid to the 
documentary system of audit firms so every single procedure has to be documented. 
Participants stressed that more systematic and restricted documentation systems have been 
applied by inspected firms to fulfil the FRC’s inspectors’ requirements. Although auditors 
feel they have spent more time completing audit files and ticking boxes, this helps them to 
justify their judgements to outsiders. This is consistent with the literature (i.e. Casterella et 
al., 2009; Tsau, 2011) where increased audit quality follows the establishment of audit 
oversight systems in different regions.          
Our analysis was extended to include the auditors' views to the AIU's inspection and their 
members of staff, providing a unique opportunity to discuss auditors’ criticisms of AIU 
inspectors and how inspectors defended themselves. We argue that there is a gap between 
auditors and AIU’s inspectors. Auditors believe that inspectors need to pay more attention to 
core issues rather than wasting auditors’ time on smaller issues; they also have to consider 
associated circumstances at the time of audit rather than inspection. In parallel, auditors have 
to provide more details to inspectors on the main issues of audit files.  
For the second strategy, we concluded that the FRC’s efforts successfully offer more 
information for public about the audit market. Extra information has been available to help 1) 
public to know more about audit firms’ governance structures 2) mid-size firms to know 
more about competition’s drivers in the market 3) audit clients to compare potential auditors. 
For example, a set of projects has been established by the FRC which mandated audit firms to 
provide more disclosures about their strategic approach and internal control systems. As cited 
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in Deumes et al. (2012), Petersen and Zwirner (2009) found that the extent of disclosures is 
positively correlated with audit quality and audit size as well.  
Compared with regulators in different regions (i.e. U.S.), we noted that the FRC provides 
more information about inspected audit firms. In the U.S., the PCAOB hides areas that need 
improvement in audit firms’ performance for one year; they only disclose them publicly if 
inspected firms do not take corrective actions. The FRC’s inspection reports inform the 
public of all areas of audit firms’ performances. However, we questioned the extent to which 
investors depend on FRC’s reports; a matter for future research. Furthermore, in 2010 the 
FRC was the first audit regulator to apply the UK Audit Firms Governance Code, when only 
the UK and Netherlands mandated their biggest audit firms to apply such code. The code 
requires audit firms to disclose publicly more information about their strategies and auditing 
approaches.  
In addition, the FRC (2010: b) argues that firms’ size and brand are the main competition 
drivers in the market, although our participant partners stressed that people and business 
relationships are the dominated ones. Changing sizes or brands may need a lot of investment. 
However, hiring and developing highly skilled people needs less investment and makes a 
bigger difference.        
For the third strategy, limited resources and unlimited liability of auditors have been 
identified as the main barriers discouraging mid-sized firms to compete in the big audit 
market. Allowing non-professionals to invest in audit firms was debated by audit regulators 
to provide more funds to the mid-size firms. However, our findings suggest that the FRC 
might avoid taking this action to allow non-practitioners to own audit firms so creating risks 
unmitigated by relevant safeguards. None of the leading markets in the US or Europe permit 
non-practitioners to invest/control audit firms. Non-practitioners’ owners may lead the 
profession to be driven by financial considerations rather than by ethics, consistent with 
Oxera (2007) who suggests negative impacts on quality of allowing non-practitioners to own 
audit firms.  Most importantly, such allowance may increase the gap between the Big 4 firms 
and the mid-sized firms. The Big 4 may be more attractive to investors and more funds will 
be available to the large rather than the mid-sized firms.  
For unlimited liabilities, auditors can only limit their liabilities after clients’ shareholder 
approvals; we believe that this should be changed. Mandating auditors’ limited liabilities 
might reduce the barriers of entering the big audit market and increase the number of big 
players. Mid-size firms would be encouraged to take the risk of auditing leading corporates if 
they knew that they will be accountable only to their work.   
In conclusion, for more than ten years, many projects have been established by the FRC to 
restore public trust in auditors. Partners of the Big 4 believe that the FRC's projects are 
effective in improving the audit quality as well as providing wider public information about 
the audit firms. Such projects enable the UK capital market to be more reliable and trusted. 
However, as explained above, more actions need to be taken to enhance the choice in auditors 
and increase the number of big audit firms that compete in the market. Table 1 presents a 
number of actions that need to be taken by the FRC suggested in this study.  
14 
 
Table 1: The FRC’s projects to rebuild public trust in auditors and suggested actions 
FRC’s projects  Purpose  Criticism/Shortage Suggested Action  Expected outcome 
1. Inspecting audit 
firms.  
Improved audit quality Inspected firms have 
concerned regarding the 
inspection’s process.     
FRC’s inspectors need to 
know auditors’ feedback.   
Conducting more 
effective inspections.  
 
2. Reviewing audit 
competition’s drivers  
Increased 
transparency 
NA We  suggest more drivers: 
people and relationships   
Better transparency  
3. Mandating 




NA NA  NA 
4. Firms’ ownership’s 




invest more in the Big 4 
firms as they are more 
profitable; this will reduce 
the competition. This 
affects auditors’ 
independence.   
Avoiding this debate. Mitigate a threat of 






Non-executives are selected 
and paid by audit firms     
investors should be 
consulted in the INEs’ 
appointment 
Increase the reliability of 
information provided 
about big audit firms.  
 




Shareholders never agreed 
to apply such agreements..   
Mandating Auditors’ 
limited liabilities  
Increase the number of 
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